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Introduction
The announced subject of this session, Financial
Fragility and the U. S. Economy, could lead us to too narrow
a focus. Financial fragility now poses a clear and present
danger to the continued prosperity of well nigh all
financially sophisticated capitalist economies. In many
economies financial fragility can now induce attempts,
simultaneous or sequential, by banks and other financing
institutions to "make position by selling out position". A
collapse of asset values, which forces the price of capital
assets below the cost of production of investment output,
could occur in many countries. This would assure that a
deep an long world wide depression will take place.
Whether or not such a debt depression takes place
depends on whether lender of last resort interventions,
which abort the need to make position by selling out
position are effective and whether aggregate profits are
sustained in the face of a credit crunch, which can follow
even successful lender of last resort interventions.1
1. The behavior of the export powerhouses of the 1980's,
Germany and Japan, is not conducive to a belief that
international cooperation to contain depressions will be
forthcoming. Germany is so fixed on containing inflation
that it raises interest rates even as its main trading
partners need to engage in expansionary monetary and fiscal
policy to contain recessions. Japan seems unable to move to
a high consumption economy that is consistent with its
manufacturing productivity. Both Germany and Japan can be
characterized as "beggaring their neighbors", i.e.3
A capitalist economy is characterized by a financial
structure which leads to the prior commitment of cash flows
received, by households, businesses, governments, banks and
non-bank financial institutions, to validate their
liabilities. These cash flows are received either from the
distribution of the value of output among the participants
in producing and financing output or from the fulfillment of
financial contracts. Liability structures, which link
yesterdays and tomorrows to today, introduce a degree of
intertemporal complexity into the economic process beyond
that due to the different expected lives of capital assets,
the gestation period for investment output and the time it
takes to transform a labor force. Such complexity renders
suspect the basic neoclassical presupposition that the
behavior of the capitalist economy can be understood by
assuming that the economy is a system that seeks and
sustains equilibrium. Once the equilibrium assumption is
abandoned all economic theory can tell us is 1 economies
need to reconcile a variety of dynamic processes, 2 the
reconciliation process is a multidimensional, intertemporal
and non-linear system and 3 from time to time such processes
generate time series that are not nice. These not nice time
series can be characterized as incoherent, chaotic or ones
that exhibit hysteresis.
sustaining their domestic prosperity even as their policies
diminish the prosperity of their trading partners.4
In economic terms not nice time series result from
situations when the reactions of impacted units to
conditions such as excess supply, excess demand, and the
shortfalls of cash receipts relative to payment commitments
on liabilities leads to the excesses or the shortfalls
becoming worse not better.
Cash Flows and Liability Structures: Fragility Defined
Long ago I defined three types of relations between a
unit's cash receipts and the cash payments mandated by the
liability structure. For reasons that are now buried in
ancient particular bits of analysis, I labeled the financial
posture of a unit as being either hedge, speculative or
1VPonzi112. A hedge posture implies that the prospective cash
flows are sufficient to fulfill contractual payment
commitments on liabilities and a speculative posture means
that the unit's cash flows are sufficient to pay
interest but insufficient to pay the principle amounts
fall due. A unit with a Ponzi financial structure
insufficient cash flows from operations or contracts it
to meet its interest payment commitment. The options
such a unit are either to increase its indebtedness
default.
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Note that payments due on liabilities are either fixed
bY contract or contingent. Cash payments on equity
liabilities are contingent upon earnings and the declaration
of dividends. Only if dividends are declared do equity
instruments lead to cash outflows. If equity looms large in
a unit's liability structure the presumption is that the
unit is a hedge financing unit.
We can postulate a spectrum of liability structures
that ranges from robustness to fragility. The overall
robustness or fragility of an economy's financial structure
is determined by the mix of hedge, speculative and Ponzi
financing units. A liability structure in which units
mainly engage in equity financing will lie towards the
robust end of the spectrum. A liability structure in which
units are heavily in debt so that speculative and even Ponzi
finance are common will be towards the fragility end of
spectrum. 3
3. Mauro Galligati and Dominic0 Delli Gatti have shown
that a well nigh standard IS-LM model can be interpreted as
leading to a stable equilibrium if the financial structure
is robust and to an unstable equilibrium if the financial
structure is fragile. Within the process framework this
means that with a robust financial structure the processes
set in motion by some excess or deficiencies tend to
decrease the excesses or deficiencies whereas in a fragile
structure processes driven by the same maximization behavior
by units tend to increase the excesses or deficiencies. See
Delli Gatti and Galligati, Financial Instability, Income
Distribution and the Stock Market, Journal of Post Keynesian
Economics, 1990, and Delli Gatti, Galligati, and Gardini,
Real Accumulation and Financial Instability, Studi
Economici, 19906
The financial instability hypothesis, or the financial
instability interpretation of Keynes, holds that over a run
of good times the financial structure evolves from being
robust to being fragile. This hypothesis rests upon the
profitability of debt financing, given the term and risk
class structures of interest rates in a robust financial
structure and the way asset values can collapse whenever
speculative and Ponzi financing units are forced to "make
position by selling out positions1V.4
Note that Ponzi financing decreases equity for debt
increases without any increase in assets. It therefor has a
limit for any private unit. It ends when equity goes to
zero. 5 For a national state habitual recourse to Ponzi
finance may well Put the economy on the "Road to
Argentina".'
The Financial Instability Hypothesis
A main theorem of the financial instability hypothesis
is that the internal dynamics of capitalist economies leads,
over a period dominated by the successful operation of a
4. Hyman P. Minsky John Maynard Keynes, Columbia
University Press, New York, New York, 1976
5. This is true unless the debtor is somehow able to cook
the books. The events of the 1980's make it clear that
there is an enormous willingness to suspend disbelief in
financial markets.
6. H.P, Minsky "The Financial Instability Hypothesis: A
Clarificationtt p.166 in The Risk Of Economic Crisis" Martin
Feldstein ed. University of Chicago Press, 1991 for a
reference to the United States as a potential Argentina.7
capitalist economy, to the emergence of financial structures
which are conducive to debt deflations, the collapse of
asset values and deep depressions. The financial
instability hypothesis models the economy as having two
price levels which are determined in quite different ways.
One is the price level of capital assets, the second is the
price level of current output. The price level of capital
assets is the present value of expected "profitsVt7: profits
are determined by investment (the structure of demands).
This approach makes the mechanisms of the debt-deflation
theory of great depressions precise. As Abba Lerner put it
many years ago the financial instability interpretation of
Keynes holds that over the time frame in which we live out
our lives "Stability is Destabilizing".8
The financial instability hypothesis has stood up well
over the past 30 years. The integration of the explanation
of financial market, investment behavior and the aggregate
performance of the economy was an essential part of post
Keynesian doctrine long before the present difficulties in
finance and the economy arose.
7. Profits are defined as gross capital income. The
distribution of profits among rent, interest, payments to
ttmanagers", profit taxes, retained earnings and distributed
dividends reflects liability structures and the business and
government tlculturesl'. H.P. Minsky Stabilizing an Unstable
Economy Yale University Press, New Haven, 1986, Chapter 7.
8. Alk Sinai has noted that economists have in general
neglected the way real and financial facets are integrated.
He seems unaware the extent to which finance is integrated
into the explanation of the progress of the economy through
time in the post - Keynesian view of things. See Alan
Sinai, Financial and Real Business Cycles, Presidential
Address, Eastern Economic Association, March 16, 1991.a
Perspectives on Economic Theory: The Smithian Legacy
Now that I have paid homage to the title of the
sessions I can turn to the subject announced in the title of
my presentation. As a first step I want to introduce the
theoretical perspective that guides what follows. Today's
mainstream economic theory starts from the famous passage by
Adam Smith:
"As every individual, therefore endeavors as much
as he can both to employ his capital in the support of
domestic industry, as so to direct that industry that
its produce may be of the greatest value; every
individual necessarily labors to render the annual
revenue of society as great as he can. He generally,
indeed, neither intends to promote the public interest,
nor knows how much he is promoting it...and by
directing that industry in such a manner as its produce
may be of the greatest value, he is intending only his
own gain, and he is in this, as in so many other cases,
led as if by an invisible hand to promote an end which
was no part of his intention.
Adam Smith
The Wealth of Nations
The invisible hand proposition is the rock upon which
neo-classical economics rests. To modern economists the
Smith passage becomes the fundamental theorem of General
Equilibrium theory - the Arrow-Debreau proposition that a
competitive equilibrium exists and it is a Pareto optimum.
It is now generally accepted that the Arrow Debreau theorem
provides little insight into the economies in which we live
out our lives because the equilibrium whose existence is9
demonstrated is not unique and is not globally stable.
Mathematical general equilibrium theory cannot be the
foundation of a meaningful economics.'
Furthermore perfect foresight needs to be assumed for
the proofs of the fundamental theorem of general equilibrium
theory to hold.
macroeconomics which
policy effectiveness
information negates
general equilibrium
The various attempts to derive a
yield underemployment equilibrium or
by assuming some form of asymmetric
the perfect foresight assumption of
theory. Therefor the asymmetric
information approach to constructing a meaningful
macroeconomics is logically flawed. It is not permissible
to first assume perfect foresight so that economic processes
would tend to generate an equilibrium and introduce
imperfections of foresight in the form of asymmetric
information.
In addition unless our theory proves the existence of a
unique equilibrium we cannot legitimately do comparative
statics exercises. All that economic analysis is restricted
to modelling dynamic processes and determining the
characteristics of the path that will emerge. The logical
foundations of the Smithian invisible hands approach have
evaporated.
Paul Davidson's Money and the Real World, Revised ed.
Macmillan, London and New York 1978.
9. The Invisible Hand: Economic Eauilibrium in the History
of Science. Bruna Ingrau and Giorgio Israel, MIT Press,
Cambridge Massachusetts and London, England, 199010
The above has a lVbigVV policy implication. The validity
of laissez-faire as a guide to policy rests upon the
validity of the proposition that "The invisible hand,
operating through markets, leads the economy to an
equilibrium which in some sense is a best that can be
achieved. With this proposition not valid the logical
foundations for laissez-faire disappears.1'
Perspectives on Economic Theory: The Keynes Legacy
The alternative to the invisible hand - comparative
static approach to economics was set out by Keynes. Keynes
wrote
"If I may be allowed to appropriate the term
speculation for the activity of forecasting the
psychology of the market, and the term enterprise for
the activity of forecasting the prospective yield of
assets over their whole life, it is by no means always
the case that speculation predominates over enterprise.
As the organization of investment markets improves, the
risk of the predominance of speculation does however
increase. Speculators do no harm as bubbles on a sea
of enterprise. But the position is serious when
enterprise becomes the bubble on a whirlpool of
speculation. When the capital development of a country
becomes the by-product of the activities of a casino,
the job is likely to be ill done."
John Maynard Keynes
The General Theory of Employment
Interest and Money
10. The various policy ineffectiveness propositions rest
upon the invisible hand leading the economy to an
equilibrium that is determined by preferences, technology
and maximization under conditions of perfect foresight.11
In this passage Keynes shifts the argument from the
Smithian emphasis upon the allocation of resources to the
capital development of the economy, the creation of
resources. 11 The creation of resources is a process in
time. It involves what Keynes called enterprise: the
forecasting of the prospective yield of assets over their
whole life. Keynes's dichotomy between enterprise and
speculation draws attention to the financial structure as an
essential element in the capital development process. In a
successful capitalist economy the financial structure abets
enterprise. When finance fosters speculation the
performance of a capitalist economy falters.
Keynesian economic theory tells us that capitalist
accumulation, which involves financial and output markets,
is a process which ties the past, present and future
together. It also allows us to identify variables that
affect the processes. These processes are not constrained
by the inherent nature of capitalist economies to lead to
satisfactory system behavior: there is no guarantee that the
processes will interact to lead to some nice coherent
expansion (growth) of the economy. In particular we know
that the dynamics are best characterized by time dependent,
nonlinear, and multidimensional relations. This implies
11. The emphasis upon the capital development of the
economy as the prime problem that economic theory need
address might best be called Schumpeterian. See J.
Schumpeter The Theory of Economic Develonment, Harvard
University Press, Cambridge mass, 1934. This is a
translation of a 1906 German text.12
that hysteresis,
time series that
time.
chaos or incoherence will characterize the
are generated, not always but from time to
If an economy is given to intermittent endogenously
determined incoherence then devices (regulations and
interventions) that contain the incoherence or impose
coherence can improve performance. Central banks are just
such devices; big government whose deficits sustain
aggregate profits in times of recession are another such
device.
The economic incoherence
considered to be analogous
containing mechanisms may be
to electronic circuits that
prevent perverse feed backs: by halting endogenous processes
they impose new initial conditions within which the
structure will generate an alternative, presumably more
satisfactory, future. Appropriate systems of intervention
are necessary if economies with the properties that result
from the complexity due to capitalist finance are to behave
in a reasonably coherent manner. Apt intervention and
interventions which thwart the thrust to incoherence is the
appropriate policy slogan, not laissez faire. 12
12. P Ferri and H P Minsky, Market Processes and Thwarting
Systems, Working Paper # 64, The Jerome Levy Economics
Institute.
P Ferri and H P. Minsky, Prices, Employment and
Profits, Journal of Post-Keynesian Economics, 1984.13
Insishts on the Bailout of Savinss and Loans and Banks
From the perspective of an economic theory that views
the economy as a set of interacting processes it is an error
to call government support of the deposit insurance system a
bailout. The need for the government to intervene to
refinance savings and loan associations and commercial banks
should be viewed as a normal and therefor expected result of
the characteristics of the economy which make intermittent
bouts of chaos, incoherence or hysteresis occur and where
the consequences of allowing free reign to such "states of
nature" are deemed unacceptable.
The specific aim of the government refinancing of banks
and thrifts is to prevent a broad set of institutions to
need to make position by selling out position. If such
selling of assets becomes necessary then, over a wide
spectrum of assets, the second hand price will be
incompatible with the production of new assets. A collapse
of investment activity is one way in which an initially
unsatisfactory situation becomes a disaster. The so called
bailout is in truth a downpayment on containing a serious
depression.
Unfortunately the technique that is in place for
refinancing banks and other institutions is inept. The
government agency that refinances banks and S&L's, The
Resolution Trust Corporation, takes assets from the deposit
insurance funds and tries to turn these assets into cash. A14
public holding company approach, The Reconstruction Finance
Corporation of the depression era is an example, to the
refinancing of banks etc would be much better. Such an
approach would treat the now failing banks as institutions
which would continue to operate after an infusion of equity
(The RFC becomes the banks owner) and the replacing of
management. The RFC approach leads to many non-performing
assets being treated as work outs rather than as requiring
foreclosures and liquidations. Continuing the '8failed1V
banks as refinanced independent institutions, though
government owned, is more conducive to economic recovery
than the present treatment, in which organizations
are.destroyed and the non-performing assets of failed
institutions act to depress asset prices.
A List of Topics
The United States, and the rest of the capitalist
world, should be engaged in a serious discussion about the
effect that the financial structure of an economy has upon
the performance of the economy. Only some one whose vision
is obstructed by the blinders of neo classical theory would
deny the following propositions:
1. A capitalist, or if you wish a market, economy is a
financial system.13
13. The western neo classical economists who have traveled
to the east to extol1 the virtues of the market economy have
done a great disservice to these economies, and to their15
2. The neoclassical way of doing economics, which rests upon
splitting the financial system off from what is called the
real economy, throws no appreciable light on the effect that
a financial system has upon the functioning of the economy:
the only relevant neoclassical position is that the
financial structure makes no difference.
3. The financial structure is significantly more fragile
now, in early 1992, than it was earlier in the post world
war II epoch.
4. This fragility makes it more likely now than hitherto in
the post World War II period that the "next" phase of our
economy will be a high level stagnation, although a deep
depression followed by a low level stagnation cannot be
ruled out.
5. A main characteristic of a capitalist economy that is
stagnant and or immersed in a deep depression is that the
"capital development of the economy'l is not going forward.
The following may not be accepted by all who are free
of the neoclassical blinders.
6. The tragedy of a prolonged stagnation and a deep
depression can be avoided by an apt reform of the financial
structure and by the apt use of the government's fiscal
powers.
prospects for a sensible resolution of the problems by not
emphasizing that their basic problem is the creation of a
financial structure and that many command economy facets
have to be sustained until a financial structure is in
place.16
Comments on the Topics
I will now comment on the implications of the above
list for the desired structure of financial institutions.
1. A capitalist, or if you wish a market, economy is a
financial system.
In a capitalist economy there are two sets of markets
and two sets of prices. One set of markets and prices is
for current output and the labor that is used to produce
current output. The other set of markets and prices is for
capital assets, either individually, as organized into
production units called plants, or as economic units called
firms and for financial instruments.
The markets for current output and for labor are the
stuff of ordinary price theory. The result is the
production and purchase of goods and services for either
consumption or investment. Prices of current outputs enable
producers to recapture their out of pocket costs. They also
carry the gross profits that firms earn. Thus the price
system of current output results in incomes to businesses,
households and governments (through taxation).
These incomes may enable these units to validate their
financial liabilities, including the liabilities held by
financial intermediaries. The receipts by financial17
intermediaries are a source of the funds that financial
institutions make available to finance investment,
consumption and government spending. The proper performance
of a capitalist economy requires that there be a well
functioning financial structure whose main orientation is
the financing of capital asset creation. As became evident
in the United States in the 1980's, unconstrained profit
seeking financial institutions are lief to use their
resources to finance speculation. Such asset based
financing can promise larger returns in the short run than
cash flows from financing enterprise can warrant.
2. The neoclassical way of doing economics, which
rests upon splitting the
called the real economy,
financial system off from what is
throws no appreciable light on the
effect that a financial system has upon the functioning of
the economy: the neoclassical position is that the financial
structure makes no difference.
This proposition is virtually self evident. The heart
of the neoclassical system is that relative prices and
outputs are determined by preferences over real goods and
services, the technology and maximization behavior. The
perfect foresight assumption of neo-classical theory means
that investment is just an allocation over time, where time
adds no special difficulty. (One implication of the neo-
classical theory is that for any capital asset at every18
moment of time the depreciated value of the original cost
equals the present value of future profits.)
Inasmuch as all relevant variables are determined by
"real relations" nothing of significance is affected by the
financial structure. This means that the neo-classical
theory cannot act as a guide to the apt structure of
financial institutions. In particular as neo-classical
economic theory divorces the financial structure from
investment. It has no room for speculation as plays on the
difference between the market evaluation of the uncertain
expected profits and the cost of producing capital assets.
It does not allow for market power to determine the value of
firms. Given these attributes the neo classical theory
cannot be a guide to the appropriate structure of banking
and financial institutions: A neo classical theorists should
stand mute when policy matters the deal with finance are on
the VVtable18 .
The earlier citation from Keynes, which specified that
the objective of economic policy is to assure that the
capital development of the economy is not "ill done",
pointed out that the "organization of investment markets"
determines whether speculation or enterprise is dominant in
an economy.
In Keynes theory it is important that financial markets
be structured so that the financing of enterprise dominates.
Expectations of longer term cash flows and not expectations19
of short term asset price movements must become the dominant
determinant of the availability of financing. As banking
regulations are moving towards using capital absorption
ratios for assets, the capital absorption ratios of cash
flow based assets should be significantly lower than that of
collateral based assets. A further way to force financing
to be based upon anticipated cash flows is to facilitate the
growth of organizations that specialize in intermediate and
long term financing of particular types of productive
assets: i.e. By compartmentalizing the financial structure.
3. The financial structure is significantly more
fragile now, in early 1992, than it was earlier in the post
world war II epoch.
The leveraged buy out movement of the 1980's led to the
growth in highly leverages firms. The growth in the money
market mutuals in the 1980's led to a large demand for short
term marketable corporate liabilities. The combined effect
of these two developments was the growth in speculative
financing. Leveraged buy outs often included "payment in
kind" bonds, i.e. the capitalization of interest (Ponzi
finance). Much of the debt of the poorer countries of the
world have had periods in which the interest due was not
paid but was capitalized into the principle due. These well
known facts, as well as the more detailed examination of the20
data, lead to the conclusion that the system is more fragile
now than in the past.14
4. This fragility makes it more likely than hitherto
that the "nextl' phase of our economy will be a high level
stagnation: even a deep depression followed by a low level
stagnation cannot be ruled out.
Financial fragility, or overindebtedness, tends to
constrain investment by business and debt financed
consumption by households. The United States economy is
burdened by a deadweight government debtI accumulated as a
result of the dreadful abuse of the government budget during
the 1980's, an abuse which is continuing today. These
conditions mean that a recovery from the current recession
will not be accompanied by buoyant private demand.
A deliberate move of the government towards a
significantly larger deficit at the current level of income
and structure of spending and taxes is not available. The
peculiar position that neo classical theory fosters, that
tax reductions are fully equivalent to resource creating
government spending, remains a major view guiding fiscal
policy and is an obstacle to apt policy. Thus the best that
can be expected is a continuation of the current miasma: a
sluggish stagnant performance.
14. Martin Wolfson, Financial Crises M E Sharpe & Co,
1986.
15. Deadweight government debt is debt that is not the
result of government resource creating activity.21
The alternative to continued sluggishness is a deep
depression. A deep depression requires the breakdown of the
financial system. The acceptance by the Congress and the
Administration of the need finance the ability of banks to
pay off depositors at par means that a debt deflation is not
likely in the foreseeable future.16 Thus the prospect is
that the economy will stagnate at the current relatively
high level, with some further deterioration quite likely but
with little or no likelihood that a massive decline such as
occurred in the early 1930's will occur in the near future.
If a depression is allowed to occur then a low level
stagnation is apt to follow
In a capitalist economy capital assets exist which are
expected to yield services to production for some time in
the future. The market value of such capital assets can
raised if Federal Reserve moves lower long term interest
rates. However unless business profit flows are sustained
mere monetary policy is ineffective. The likelihood for a
further decline in expected nominal value of profit flows
cannot be ruled out given the extent of excess capacity:
this is particularly true of commercial real estate.
5. A main
is stagnant and
characteristic of a capitalist economy that
or immersed in a deep depression is that the
"capital development of the economyt8 is not going forward.
16 The governments of major capitalist countries protect
deposit liabilities of banks even in the absence of formal
deposit insurance.22
There are two ways in which the capital development of
an economy can be "ill done". One is that the investments
being financed are inept and the second is that investment
is insufficient to maintain a close approximation to full
employment. In the past decade the United State's financial
structure first was very good at financing inept
investments. It is now doing a fine job of financing
insufficient investment to create a progressive full
employment economy.
The vast overhang of office and other commercial
construction and the declining competitiveness of United
States managed manufacturing, which are legacies of the
1980's, are evidence that something was basically wrong with
the financial structure as a selector of what is financed.
The United States's financial structure is a mixture of
institutions that originate financing and market based
institutions that hold paper which they IlbuyVV from markets.
The securitization of standard mortgages was a technique by
which Savings and Loans and Mortgage companies originated
mortgages which were then packaged as securities for the
portfolios of holders such as pension funds, life insurance
companies, mutual trusts and various international holders.
Because of the way the mortgages were packaged it was
possible to sell off a package of mortgages at a premium so
that the originator and the investment banking firms walked
away from the deal with a net income and no recourse from
the holders. The instrument originators and the security23
underwriters did not hazard any of their wealth on the
longer term viability of the underlying projects. Obviously
in such packaged financing the selection and supervisory
functions of lenders and underwriters are not as well done
as they might be when the fortunes of the originators are at
hazard over the longer term. All that was required for the
originators to earn their stipend was skill avoiding obvious
fraud and in structuring the package.
An easier filter for financing ruled after
securitization was developed than before. Furthermore more
money was chasing financing deals than hitherto. As the
thrifts were released from financing single family homes,
their funds became available for financing new activities:
land development, construction financing and commercial
mortgages. This funds availability was combined with a
pricing structure by which developers made money from
construction quite independently of the success of their
projects. The combination of perverse incentives guaranteed
that both over and wrong type of building would take place.
If financing is to select viable projects the use of
other peoples money has to be restricted to vehicles which
have been proven in the market or to deals in which the unit
that selects and structures the deal also finances the deal.
To be brief the crisis of the 90's is making us overlook
that the projects financed in the 80's set up the current
crisis. Deregulation in the 1980's was one source of the24
current difficulties, for the managers of the deposit
insurance funds were not willing or able to contain the
exposure of the funds by constraining the deals that could
be financed with insured deposits.17
Another thing that went wrong is that the new players
in town, the various pension funds, were often patsy's for
those who approached them with deals.18
If the capital development is to be done better in the
future than the excesses of the 1980 indicate they were done
in the past,
may well be
constrained
portfolios.
then constraints upon what pension funds can do
needed. Mutual funds have to be more closely
by tight definitions of
The other way in which the capital development of the
economy may be ill done is if investment is insufficient to
maintain a close approximation to full employment. The
financial structure that Keynes advocated is still relevant:
their allowable
the socialization of investment as a supplement to private
investment. This socialization of investment should take a
multitude of forms: the current concern about the inadequacy
of infrastructure development may lead to extending
financing mechanisms, such as the dedicated taxes for
highway and airport construction, to other areas. Other
17. Martin Mayer, The Greatest-Ever Bank Robbery,
Scribners & Co, New York, 1990
18. Sarah Bartlett, The Money Machine, Warner Books, New
York, 1991.25
devices, including capital budgeting, development banks and
the flexible use of government holding companies, are
feasible. A greater reliance on government operated fee for
service infrastructures may also be desirable. We might
well turn to conscious cross subsidization on the European
model, such as having gasolene taxes provide funds for
public transportation and commuter railways.
The administration's proposals for financial system
reform, which came to virtually naught in the recent
Congress, were deficient in that they did not address the
problem of how poorly the capital development of the economy
was done in the 1980's. The administration took a rather
simple minded approach to the issues. They somehow believed
that universal rather than compartmentalized banking and
finance was the way to foster stability in finance.
In a recent paper prepared for a conference at the
Jerome Levy Institute Jan Kregel pointed out that German
financial structure is much more complicated than the common
Unites States image of a four bank universal bank financial
structure would indicate: there are a large number of
specialized financial institutions.1'
In creating a financial structure that aids and abets
the capital development of an economy specialized financial
19. Jan Kregel, Markets and Institutions in the Financinq
of Business: Germanv, Japan and the USA. Prepared for a
Jerome Levy Economics Institute Conference: Restructuring
the Financial System for Economic Growth, November 21-3,
1991. Annandale on Hudson, New York, NY26
institutions, each of which has a well defined primary
domain, are necessary. One model of a compartmentalized
financial structure was the United States in the aftermath
of the great depression. In the light of that structure
which led to one of the great periods of American Economic
development serious consideration should be given to
creating a modern compartmentalized financial structure for
the United States.2o
Community banks are at the heart of a financial
structure that will be biased towards resource creation.
These banks would offer both insured and non-insured
checkable deposits. The insured checkable deposit should be
mainly offset by home mortgages. The standard home mortgage
for the portfolio of the community banks should be something
like a 20% down payment mortgage of which 50% is at a fixed
rate and 50% at a variable rate. The term to maturity of
the mortgages can be quite long. Aside from home mortgages,
the offset to insured deposits should be restricted to
government debt and Federal Reserve deposits. The mortgage
portfolio may be no more than 80% of the checkable insured
deposits, cash 4% and mainly government debt 16%. The
equity absorption of these accounts should be about 4%. The
mortgages in the portfolio should be originated by the
20. If we consider an economy without a government debt and
require a 91safe1' checking and deposit system then limiting
banks to specified earning assets and forbidding banks to
engage in activities that may compromise their ability to
redeem deposits is a logical way to go. The root of Glass
Steagall may well lie in the desire to create narrow banks
in the absence of a government debt.27
community bank and they should be from some defined
geographical area surrounding the bank's home office.
In addition community banks should offer interest
bearing non insured checkable accounts which reflect
positions in a portfolio of short term assets which are
protected by some 8% of cash and 8% of bank equity: these
short term assets would be well structured loans to local
businesses, high grade commercial paper and government debts
up to some intermediate term.
All checkable accounts should be fee for service
accounts: the fees for the use of the checking service
should be such that the function of providing checks should
be a profit center. Debit cards, as a payment system that
is viable because of the vender's discount, should be
encouraged.
6. The tragedy of a prolonged stagnation and a deep
depression can be avoided by an apt reform of the financial
structure and by the apt use of the government's fiscal
powers.
The above may not be accepted by all who are free of
the neoclassical blinders. One reason for this may well be
that the power of United States policy to control the United
States economy has been much attenuated by the changes of
the 19801's. In particular the cumulative effects of the
growth of the dead weight debt, the well nigh destruction of28
the revenue system over the 1980's and the loss of the
dominant international asset position have combined to
diminish the fiscal autonomy of the United States.
The principles of the reform of the financial system
that are needed were set out earlier. But reform of the
financial system is not enough. Fiscal reform must
accompany financial reform: the reform needs to be on both
the revenue and the spending side. On the revenue side an
"in principle I) balanced budget must be achieved. This means
that a tax system needs to be in place which will not only
pay for current operations but will also pay interest on the
public debt: "Ponzi" financing by the government needs to
come to a halt. Even though the government, unlike private
institutions may not exhaust its balance sheet equity, Ponzi
financing by government means that an inflation tax will in
time contain the real size of the government debt. The
threat of an inflation tax means that private long term debt
financing needs to be at rates that compensate for the
expected erosion of the purchasing power of the principle
due in the future. This inflation premium in interest rates
is in fact an amortization of the principle.
Given that government spending on the order of
magnitude of 20/25 % of gross national product is desirable
on stabilization grounds, the balanced budget rule requires
that the revenue system wield some 20 to 25 % of GNP when
GNP is at the targeted rate. This means that the government29
revenue system will need to depend on more than income
taxes: various forms of fee for services and direct taxes
need to be in the revenue mix.
The spending side requires a large overhaul. The
Keynes phrase "the socialization of investment" means that
the government spending program needs to finance a
significant part of the resource creation of the economy.
Some of the resource creation financed in all or part by
government funds may end up as privately managed, profit
earning capital assets. The subsidies in the form of land
grants for which financed railroad building comes to mind.
Federal mortgage insurance llsocializedlq  part of the risk of
financing single family housing.
In particular in principle income from work, where if
necessary the work is provided by government, should replace
much of today's transfer payment schemes. I see no way to
create a society in which the socially divisive transfer
payment systems are within bounds that are broadly
acceptable without a revival in one form or another of the
depression era work schemes: the WPA, NYA and CCC of the
1930's need to be in the arsenal of social and economic
policy.
Such a package of reforms, where the government debt,
though growing, is always in principle, i.e when the economy
is at a close approximation to full employment, being
validated by revenues will not return the economy to full30
employment overnight. It will mean that the accumulation of
government debt in private portfolios will be an
accumulation of default free and readily transferable
assets. On reason why the massive deficits of the Reagan
years did not lead to a buoyant expansion was that the
revenue system had been compromised. This meant that the
increases in the government debt was not a one for one
increase in liquidity. A fiscal system based upon an in
principle balanced budget is a way of assuring that a period
of government deficit financing is followed by a period in
which buoyant private demand does the job.31
Conclusion
There is a sharp difference in the view of the economy
that follows from the Smithian and the Keynesian
perspective. In particular the Smithian perspective leads
to the conclusion that the financial structure is irrelevant
whereas the Keynesian perspective leads to the conclusion
that effective financing is necessary for the capital
development of the economy and that there is a need to
constrain any tendency of what Keynes called speculation to
dominate. The Smithian perspective as it developed imported
the notion of equilibrium from the physical sciences. Neo-
classical theory rests upon the assumption that the economy
has an equilibrium and that this equilibrium has desirable
properties.
The historical Keynes molded his argument in terms of
equilibrium but the essential elements of Keynesian theory,
the financial theory of investment and the investment theory
of business cycles, is best treated as an analysis of the
outcomes of processes that operate in time. Process
analysis, where one day leads into another, allows for the
path of the economy through time to be incoherent  - run away
inflations and debt deflation depressions are possible
resolutions of the interactions among the processes of the
economy.32
These two perspectives lead to diametrically opposite
approaches to both an understanding of economies and to
policy. The Smithian perspective leads to the conclusion
that laissez faire is the appropriate philosophy of policy.
A consistent application of the Keynes perspective leads to
the conclusion that apt policy, i.e. policy guided by an
understanding of how an economy can shoot off into
thoroughly unsatisfactory states, is necessary for economies
to behave in a satisfactory manner. Given the way the
economy is behaving now it seems as if what I call the
Keynes perspective is the better guide for economic policy.